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1 Introduction
It is well recognized by now, both among practitioners and scholars, that proper infras-
tructures are key to economic development. Several empirical studies illustrate the impact
of infrastructures on economic growth.1 A 1 % increase in the stock of infrastructures
can increase GDP by up to .20 %. Despite this importance, some low-developed countries
suffer significant shortages in accessing to crucial infrastructures. For instance, the stock
and quality levels of infrastructures in Latin America and Caribbean countries has lost
significant ground relative to East Asia and OECD countries. To illustrate that point,
Calderon and Serven (2002) show that, from 1980 to 1997, the Latin America infrastruc-
ture gap relative to East Asia grew by 40% for roads, 70% for telecommunications and
nearly 90% for power generation. These authors argue that this widening infrastructure
gap can account for nearly 25% of the Latin America’s GDP output gap relative to the
East Asian economies over the 1980-2000 period.
In response to this issue, and given the scarcity of public funds in LDCs,2 most de-
veloping countries have turned to the foreign private sector for financing and operating
infrastructures. However, a number of difficulties have emerged from this strategy. First,
some countries have failed to attract foreign investments. Second, even those who suc-
ceeded have sometimes faced a high rate of renegotiation for these contracts.3 Initiated
by governments or concessionnaries, renegotiation has often created public opposition to
what is sometimes presented, for water concessions in particular, as a loss of sovereignty.
Whatever the strength of the motivations behind these public positions, alternative
ways of financing infrastructures should be looked for. How to reconcile the need for more
investment in public infrastructures and the aspiration of LDCs for a close control of their
public services is a major political question today.
Cooperation among small LDCs, such as those of Central America or of the Mediter-
anean Rim, might be a potential solution. Sometimes the least-cost approach to improv-
ing the supply of infrastructure services requires cross-country integration of networks or
shared access to a common resource. This is certainly the case for infrastructure projects
that arise out of the growth of commerce and trade. Examples include road and rail net-
works, power grids4 and telecommunication networks. This is also the case for projects
1See for the case of Latin America, Calderon, Easterly and Serven (2002) and Calderon and Serven
(2002) among others.
2A recent report by the World Bank mentioned “When times are hard, capital spending on infrastruc-
ture is the first item to go... Despite the long-term economics costs of slashing infrastructure spending,
governments find it less politically costly than reducing public employment or wages.” World Development
Report 1994, p. 19.
3See Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2002).
4A typical example of such a joint project is the Itaipu hydroelectricity power plant on the Brazil-
Paraguay border. To give an idea of the scale of such a project, that dam corresponds to 25% of energy
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which are less commercially-driven such that investments in environmental protection and
the management of shared resources such as water.5 This paper develops a theoretical
framework to explore the allocative and distributive consequences of those transnational
coordinations.
Infrastructures often entail fixed costs which are so large that no single country can
afford to build the infrastructure alone. Those fixed costs must be shared by several
countries. An infrastructure can thus be viewed as a public good for which some financing
mechanism must be agreed upon by partners involved in the project. This perspective
raises of course the ugly head of the free-rider problem which arises when an efficient
Coasian bargaining fails. Such inefficiencies are particularly relevant in contexts plagued
by informational asymmetries.
A general lesson from the literature on public good mechanisms developed over the last
thirty years is that, under asymmetric information, the optimal mechanism may require
some deviations away from the first-best. In our context, a country may pretend having
a low willingness to pay for the public good to minimize its own contribution and let
partners bear the bulk of investment. To curb those incentives, the project should be
sometimes given up even though it would have been optimal to build it under complete
information.
This important insight has been so far derived by looking at the provision of a public
good for individual agents, not for countries. Countries can only be reduced to individual
agents under the very restrictive assumption that all inhabitants are the same. Agents are
in fact heterogeneous and may differ with respect to their wealth or their willingness to
pay for the public good. Individual preferences are only aggregated through some political
process. Politics determines the weights of the various types of agents in the objective
functions of the governments involved in bargaining over the collective decision to build
or not the common infrastructure.
In this paper, we argue that the most convenient framework to fully assess the alloca-
tive and distributive consequences of transnational public good mechanisms should make
explicit this distinction between countries and individuals. The theoretical framework
should account for two distinct layers of contracting and allow for a nested information
structure. The first layer concerns the countries (or more precisely their governments) in-
volved in bargaining. Countries are privately informed on the aggregate expected welfare
supply in Brasil and 78% in Paraguay.
5Both kinds of transnational projects have recently been successfully implemented. Power links are
already in place between Jordan and Syria, and between Syria and Lebanon. Plans have been developed to
include Israel, the West Bank and Gaza but also other SubSaharan countries. An example of the second
kind is given by the Marine Pollution Management Project developed by southwestern Mediteranean
countries to enhance the capacity of countries like Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lybia and Egypt to deal
with marine pollution
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they get from building the infrastructure and tend to minimize their respective contri-
butions. The second layer deals with the fact that, within each country, agents have
private information on the individual benefits they derive from the infrastructure. Opti-
mal pricing of the service is then constrained by this added asymmetric information. The
redistributive concerns of the governments affect pricing and may create a wedge between
price and marginal cost to redistribute wealth across various groups.
With transnational projects, each country is externally constrained by the rules of the
mechanism for collective choice. A collective solution to the bargaining problem, maybe
designed under the aegis of an international agency (thereafter IA), defines each coun-
try’s financial contribution to the common project and, whether it should be built or
not. Different degrees of enforcement of these transnational mechanisms impose various
external constraints on the redistributive concerns at the local level. The prices charged
to consumers for using the infrastructure may then result from a compromise between
these external constraints and the redistributive concerns of the governments. As a re-
sult, there is little hope to see transnational infrastructures being priced as simple “local
public goods” which would have been self-financed by each country alone. To make the
international negotiation easier, pricing policies in the different countries involved may be
deeply intertwined. This paper precisely analyzes these distributive and allocative issues.
To set up the stage, we assume that an IA is in charge of raising contributions from two
countries interested in building a transnational infrastructure and proposes a mechanism
to be played by those countries. That mechanism determines the countries’ contributions
and the probability of building or not the infrastructure. Countries are made of hetero-
geneous agents with different preferences for the public good. At the aggregate level,
countries may differ with respect to their preferences for redistribution and have private
information on those preferences. Different levels of enforcement of the mechanism are
analyzed.
In the most comprehensive contracting environment, the IA can suggest the prices
charged to consumers and acceptance of the mechanism by each country is mandatory.
The optimal mechanism which maximizes the sum of expected welfares in both countries
selects the efficient6 decision to build or not the infrastructure and induces pricing schemes
in each country which depend only on its own redistributive concerns.
The drawback of such an efficient mechanism is that incentive compatibility at the
countries’ level might be obtained by leaving the countries the most eager to redistribute
with a negative level of expected welfare. When the possibility of opting out of the
mechanism is taken into account, a country’s incentives to report truthfully its preferences
for redistribution may conflict with the exercice of those sovereign rights. The contribution
6In a sense to be defined below.
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to the collective project of a country which is eager to redistribute must be reduced. The
project can no longer be performed as often as if the countries’ preferences were common
knowledge. Under weak conditions, pricing schemes in both countries are now intertwined.
Asymmetric information between countries exacerbate redistributive concerns of the local
governments and reinforce the conflict due to asymmetric information within the countries.
Contrary to standard public good problems where pricing and decision to build or not
the infrastructure are jointly determined, the nested structure of our model suggests that
the IA may not have the full control of the prices charged within each country. Instead,
pricing may be still decided by governments if they cannot commit to relinquish these
rights to the IA. The only remaining tool available to the IA for screening purposes is then
the probability of building the project. De facto, pricing in one country is independent
of pricing in the other and obeys only to the local redistributive concerns. However, the
probability of cancelling the project must be increased since this is now the only way that
countries can be screened apart. Inefficiencies in bargaining are then more severe.
Finally, we also analyze the case where the IA has also some redistributive concerns
and wants to promote either the welfare of poor countries as a whole, or at a more
disaggregated level, the welfare of poor individuals within countries. Those concerns for
redistribution reinforce inefficiencies. Far from helping countries in promoting the well-
being of the poorest agents, those concerns may force to cancel international projects
more often and to distort consumption even more.
Our paper lies at the intersection of two different trends of the literature: on the one
hand, the traditional analysis of public good mechanisms under informational constraints;
on the other hand, the recent and growing game theoretic literature on transnational pub-
lic goods. Following Groves (1973), the seventies have witnessed important innovations in
the design of collective decision mechanisms to mitigate the costs of the free-rider problem.
Green and Laffont (1977) characterized mechanisms implementing the first-best produc-
tion of public goods. Green and Laffont (1976) and Walker (1980) showed that no such
mechanism exists which is budget-balanced. D’Aspremont and Grard-Varet (1979) and
Arrow (1979) showed that, by weakening the equilibrium concept from dominant strat-
egy to Bayesian-Nash, budget-balance can be achieved. However, Laffont and Maskin
(1979) proved that it was often impossible to satisfy also interim individual rationality
constraints. Only more recently, some authors have turned to the second-best problem of
designing a collective decision mechanism which maximizes expected social welfare under
incentive, participation and budget-balanced constraints. The main contributions along
those lines are due to Ledyard and Palfrey (1999), Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postle-
waite (1990). These papers are concerned with individual agents and have not developped
the hierarchical and nested information structure that is necessary to fully understand the
redistributive and allocative consequences of transnational public goods. On the other
5
hand, transnational (or more generally global) public goods have been analyzed in game
theoretic environments by Arce and Sandler (2000) and Sandler (1998, 2000). The focus
of this literature is on the role of IAs as mediators who provide communication devices,
expanding from Nash to correlated the set of equilibria of contribution games. We bor-
row from this literature the idea that IAs play a fundamental role in designing collective
mechanisms but we put at the core of the analysis the informational constraints that those
IAs face in doing so.
Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3, we derive the important benchmark where
the preferences for redistribution in both countries are common knowledge. Asymmetric
information on those preferences is introduced in Section 4. Participation constraints of
the countries are taken into account in Section 5 which is central to the paper. In Section
6, we investigate what happens when countries keep control of the pricing schemes. The
consequences of having an IA with some redistributive concerns are analyzed in Section
7. Section 8 summarizes our main findings and discusses some extensions of the basic
model. Proofs are relegated in an Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Preferences and Technology
We consider two countries Ci (i = 1, 2) with their respective governments Gi. Those
countries want to build a common infrastructure. Examples of such infrastructures are a
common transportation or telecommunication network, a common power grid, a common
nuclear or hydroelectricity plant. Each country is unable to finance alone such a large
scale project whose cost is F . Both countries have thus to contribute to the financing of
a public good which has a 0− 1 nature: building or not the infrastructure.7
In each country, there is a continuum of agents with mass one. These agents may have
different preferences for the private use of the infrastructure. Their utility function over
the quantity x of private consumption8 and the corresponding payment made t is:
U = θv(x)− t, (1)
where v(·) is increasing and concave with the Inada conditions being satisfied (v′ > 0, v′′ <
0, v′(0) = +∞, v′(+∞) = 0). Introducing the private use of the infrastructure is required
7Note that there is no alternative to the common infrastructure. The next-best infrastructure gives
zero payoff to each agent. This assumption simplifies significantly the analysis.
8This consumption can be viewed as the amount of electricity consumed if the infrastructure is a
power grid or a hydroelectricity plant or the number of phone calls for a telecommunication network.
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to understand how pricing within each country is affected by the external constraints
imposed by the collective decision mechanism.
The parameter θ represents the intensity of an agent’s preferences. For instance, θ may
reflect the agent’s wealth. With this interpretation, richer people are also the most eager
to use the infrastructure. θ belongs to the set Θ = {θ, θ¯} (we denote by ∆θ = θ¯ − θ the
spread of the distribution) with respective probabilities 1− ν and ν. We will assume that
θ > ν
1−ν∆θ to always ensure a positive consumption in all the second-best environments
described below.
For further references, it is useful to define the first-best surplus of an agent with type
θ consuming x units of services provided by the infrastructure as S(θ, x) = θv(x)− cx− F
2
where c is the constant marginal cost of using the infrastructure and F
2
is the share of the
fixed cost that should be paid by this agent.9 Of course, efficiency is characterized by the
following first-best consumption x∗(θ) for an agent with type θ:
θv′(x∗(θ)) = c. (2)
Gi maximizes a weighted sum of Ci inhabitants’ utilities. Denoting by Ui(θ) the utility
of an agent with preferences θ, Gi’s objective function is:
αiνUi(θ¯) + (1− αiν)Ui(θ).10
where αi < 1 is a non-negative parameter representing Gi’s preferences for redistribution.
As αi decreases, the concerns for redistribution towards the poor are more pronounced.
In the limiting case where αi = 0, the government is Rawlsian and cares only about the
poor with the smallest utility level. When αi is close to 1, Gi behaves instead as a pure
expected utility maximizer concerned only with efficiency.
To further stress the trade-off between efficiency and redistributive concerns of the
government, it is useful to rewrite this objective function as:
νUi(θ¯) + (1− ν)Ui(θ)− ν(1− αi)
(
Ui(θ¯)− Ui(θ)
)
. (3)
Countries may differ with respect to the weights αi. We assume that the αis are i.i.d
in {α, α¯} (where 0 ≤ α < α¯ < 1) with respective probabilities 1 − q and q. We denote
by ∆α = α¯ − α the spread of this distribution. This can be viewed as a proxy for the
maximal degree of polarization between those countries. For technical reasons, we will
assume that α > q
1−q∆α so that the virtual preferences for redistribution defined below
remain positive.
9For simplicity, we assume that the two symmetric countries share equally the fixed-cost and finance
that amount with lump-sum taxation in a first-best environment.
10Ledyard and Palfrey (1999) have analyzed such objective functions in the case of a pure public good
produced for a single country. Maximization of this objective under incentive constraints yields an interim
efficient allocation in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983).
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2.2 Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information plays a role at two levels: within and across countries.
Within Each Country: Agents cannot be discriminated directly on the basis of
their tastes which is their private information, but only with respect to their individual
consumptions. Pricing has to be incentive compatible and satisfy the self-selection con-
straints of the different types of consumers. The government’s concerns for redistribution
lead us to define in a rather standard way11 the virtual surplus S˜(θ, x, αi) of an agent
with type θ consuming x units as respectively his true first-best surplus if θ = θ¯ and a
modified surplus
S˜(θ, x, αi) =
(
θ − ν
1− ν (1− αi)∆θ
)
v(x)− cx− F
2
when θ = θ.
Note that the virtual surplus depends explicitly on αi and that it is lower than the first-
best surplus both in absolute terms but also at the margin. If the country with preferences
αi were able to self-finance the infrastructure, it is these virtual surpluses which would be
maximized for both types of consumers. A poor agent would thus consume a second-best
amount: (
θ − ν
1− ν (1− αi)∆θ
)
v′(x˜(θ, αi)) = c, (4)
whereas a rich one would still consume the first-best quantity x˜(θ¯, αi) = x
∗(θ¯). Note that
S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯) > S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α) because ∆α > 0.
Within each country, the poor consume less than the first-best. Indeed, ensuring
incentive compatibility for the rich requires such a distortion to compensate for the redis-
tribution which is achieved through pricing. A α¯-government which is the less concerned
with redistribution distorts less the consumption of the poor. This also implies that the
α¯-country prefers a less egalitarian distribution of utilities than the α-one.
Across Countries: The government and the agents within a given country Ci have
private information on αi.
12 That assumption can be motivated on several grounds. First,
it may capture the fact that the political process within each country may not be com-
pletely transparent for outsiders. For instance, the government of a given country may be
11See Ledyard and Palfrey (1999) for instance.
12Assuming that agents know the redistributive concerns of the government simplifies the presentation
and avoids some technicalities associated with solving an informed principal problem which would appear
if only Gi was privately informed on αi. Note nevertheless that this informed principal problem would not
be an issue because we are in a context of private values where the principal’s type does not enter directly
into the preferences of the agent and all utilities are quasi-linear. As in Maskin and Tirole (1990), the
same contractual outcome as under complete information on αi within the country would be obtained.
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more or less biased towards the rich depending on its degree of corruption or the latter
group’s political influence. Second, the linear specification of the government’s prefer-
ences can be viewed as a tractable way of introducing a trade-off between efficiency and
redistribution in a model with quasi-linear utility functions as argued by Ledyard and
Palfrey (1999).13 Asymmetric information on the preferences for redistribution can thus
be viewed as a proxy for asymmetric information on the budget constraint faced by the
country. This seems a highly plausible assumption in the case of LDCs where inefficiencies
in the tax systems or in national accounting procedures are likely to throw a veil on the
budget constraint. With this interpretation of our model in mind, a government’s incen-
tives to lie on its concerns for redistribution can be viewed as coming from its incentives
to lie on its true budget constraint and thus on how much it can contribute to the joint
project.
For completeness, we provide in the Appendix a simple model which endogenizes
simultaneously our modeling choices of objective functions and asymmetric information.
In this simple model, we show that a benevolent government putting a priori an equal
weight on all different types of agents in its objective function would actually behave
as in (3) because of asymmetric information on the agents’ tastes. Then αi reflects the
shadow cost of the country’s budget constraint. Private information on budget is thus
akin to private information on αi. In what follows, we will thus assimilate a rich (resp.
poor) country as having preferences for redistribution given by α¯ (resp. α) but our model
allows for alternative interpretations. More generally, a α¯-country is less concerned with
redistribution than a α-one.
2.3 Timing
The timing of the game is as follows. First, agents in each country Ci learn their individual
tastes θ. Government Gi and agents in Ci learn also the preferences for redistribution αi.
Second, the IA proposes to both governments a mechanism to finance the common project.
Acceptance can be mandatory or not. Third, both governments choose simultaneously
how much to contribute to the mechanism and which prices they would like to charge to
consumers. Lastly, agents choose their consumption and pay the corresponding price.
13This tractability is key to embed the model of intra-country redistribution into a transnational
context. It avoids having to handle a true social welfare function defined over the utilities of different
types and having to fully endogenize the shadow cost of public funds. In such a more complete and may
be more realistic model, the degree of inequality aversion of the government generally depends on the
budget constraint it faces (see Martimort (2001) for a model along these lines). When inequality aversion
decreases with wealth, a poorer country will have more incentives to redistribute. A poor (resp. rich)
country can thus be viewed as one having a parameter α (resp. α¯).
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2.4 Mechanisms for Collective Decision
An international agency (IA)14 acts as a third-party offering to both countries a collective
decision mechanism to share the fixed-cost of the infrastructure and determine the prices
charged to the different types of consumers in each country. The IA provides thus an
institutional solution to the bargaining problem between the countries. The IA acts indeed
as a “mediator” in the sense of Myerson and Sattherwaite (1983). It collects contributions,
commits to build the infrastructure with some probability and recommends prices. It does
not bring any external funds.15,16 Accordingly, this third-party is a benevolent welfare
maximizer putting an equal weight on each country in its objective function. Had both
governments being efficiency maximizers (αi = 1) the IA would be concerned with ex ante
efficiency. Instead, the existence of redistributive concerns at the local level means that
the IA is concerned with ex ante constrained efficiency where the term constrained should
be understood as capturing those local redistributive concerns only.
Given the two-tier asymmetric information postulated (both on tastes but also on
the countries’ preferences for redistribution), a mechanism stipulates first the probability
p(·) of building the infrastructure and the overall contribution of each country Ti(·) as
a function of the reports αˆ = (αˆ1, αˆ2) made by both countries on their preferences for
redistribution. Second, given those reports, the mechanism stipulates also what should
be the price paid ti(·, αˆ) and the consumptions xi(·, αˆ) of each agent in Ci as a function
of his own report θˆ on his taste parameter. A mechanism is thus a vector of functions{
p(αˆ); Ti(αˆ); ti(θˆ, αˆ); xi(θˆ, αˆ)
}
. Using the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of gen-
erality in looking for direct mechanisms where truthful reports are optimal strategies.17
To cover the overall contribution of a given country plus the cost of producing private
services within that country, the prices charged to both types of consumers must satisfy
for any profile α of preferences:
Ti(α) = p(α)E
θ
(ti(θ, α)− cxi(θ, α)) . (5)
This expression shows that the contribution of a country to the project is covered by the
14Like the World Bank and its regional counterparts, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the African Development Bank.
15It is easy to introduce some amount of external financing in our framework. If we denote by F ′ the
fixed-cost of the project, and by K the amount of external funds provided, our model could account for
this extension provided that F ′ −K is now viewed as the fixed-cost of the project.
16Other roles of the IA could be introduced. Schiff and Winters (2002) stress the role of international
organizations in inducing more cooperative outcomes by fostering trust and providing expertise on state-
of-the-art technology, engineering and financing. Section 7 analyzes the case of an IA with redistributive
concerns.
17Because αi is known by both the government Gi and the residents of Ci, the IA could use a more
complex revelation mechanism eliciting costlessly this commonly known but non-verifiable information
(see Maskin (1999)). To rule out those mechanisms, we assume that the IA is unable to communicate
directly with individuals.
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prices paid by local consumers. Of course these prices are only charged conditionally on
the fact that the project is realized.18
Notations: Given the symmetry of the model, we focus on symmetric mechanisms, omit
indices and sometimes denote overall contributions as T¯ = Ti(α¯, α¯), Tˆ1 = T1(α¯, α) =
T2(α, α¯), Tˆ2 = T1(α, α¯) = T2(α¯, α) and T = Ti(α, α). The probabilities of building the
infrastructure are also written as p¯ = p(α¯, α¯), pˆ = p(α¯, α) = p(α, α¯) and p = p(α, α).
Finally, still for a symmetric mechanism, we denote consumptions by xi(θ, α) = x(θ, α).
Similar conventions hold for the prices ti(·) and the utilities Ui(·).
The mechanism works as follows. First, countries report their preferences for redistri-
bution, pay a contribution and are offered a menu of possible prices and consumptions for
agents within the country. Second, agents choose within the proposed menus how much
they want to consume and pay the corresponding prices. This implies that their incentive
compatibility constraints are written for a given pair of truthful reports α = (α1, α2).
19
Although, there is a single grand-contract offered by the IA, that mechanism can easily be
interpreted as a nexus of bilateral contracts, one between countries and other ones within
each country defining the pricing scheme. The key thing to notice is that those contracts
are cooperatively designed by the IA, except in Section 6 below.
3 Common Knowledge on Countries’ Preferences
Let us first suppose that the IA has complete information on the countries’ profile of
preferences for redistribution α = (α1, α2).
20
Within each country, the agents’ incentive constraints can thus be expressed in terms
of the utility Ui(θ, α) they get and their consumptions xi(θ, α). These contraints are
18Note that the contribution defined by (5) is paid upfront, i.e., before the realization of the project
or not. To balance the budget of each government, we must ensure that this contribution is covered by
what can be raised from consumers net of the cost of using the infrastructure. Note also that there is
no need to have countries pay different amounts depending on whether the project is built or not in this
context with quasi-linear utility functions. Only the upfront payment matters for providing incentives to
the countries for revealing their information.
19This is akin to a dominant strategy requirement when writing the agents’ incentive constraints.
Alternatively, we could assume that the agents and the countries report simultaneously. Given that an
agent in Ci does not know α−i, we would have to focus on Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints.
As shown in Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992), there is nevertheless no loss of generality in focusing
on dominant strategy implementation as long as the decision rule is monotonic, a property which holds
in the sequel.
20Alternatively, this can be viewed as a setting where the IA uses revelation schemes la Maskin making
both each government Gi and the inhabitants of Ci report the commonly known piece of information αi.
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respectively
Ui(θ¯, α) = p(α)
(
θ¯v(xi(θ¯, α))− ti(θ¯, α)
) ≥ p(α) (θ¯v(xi(θ, α))− ti(θ, α))
= Ui(θ, α) + p(α)∆θv(xi(θ, α)). (6)
and
Ui(θ, α) = p(α) (θv(xi(θ, α))− ti(θ, α)) ≥ p(α)
(
θv(xi(θ¯, α))− ti(θ¯, α)
)
= Ui(θ¯, α)− p(α)∆θv(xi(θ¯, α)). (7)
As it is standard in two-type adverse selection models,21 the relevant (binding) con-
straint is that of the rich agent θ¯, namely (6) whereas (7) will be slack at the optimum
as it can be checked ex post on the solution.
Contributions must cover the (expected) cost of building the project under any profile
of preferences:
2∑
i=1
Ti(α) ≥ p(α)F. (8)
We rewrite this constraint using (5) and the definitions of Ui(θ, α) given above as:
2∑
i=1
(
p(α)E
θ
(S(θ, xi(θ, α))− Ui(θ, α)
)
≥ 0. (9)
Intuitively, the sum of expected surpluses in both countries computed for the consumption
profile xi(θ, α) must equal the sum of utilities redistributed within each country.
Being given the preferences profile α, the IA solves the following problem:
(TP )FB : max
{p(·);Ui(·),xi(·),V˜i(·)}
2∑
i=1
V˜i(α),
subject to (6)-(7)-(9) and
V˜i(α) = αiνUi(θ¯, α) + (1− αiν)Ui(θ, α). (10)
In the Appendix, we show that solving (TP )FB amounts in fact to solving the following
simpler problem:
(TP )FB∗ : max
{p(·),xi(·)}
p(α)
{
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(
S˜(θ, xi(θ, α), αi)
)}
.
21See Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 2).
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This simple objective aggregates the rich agents’ incentive constraint (6) and the
budget-balanced constraint (9) to get a more compact expression which depends only on
the probability of building the project and the consumption profiles conditionally on its
realization. A first trivial observation is that the IA uses together these two tools to
maximize the sum of expected welfares in both countries.
Because governments in both countries have some redistributive concerns, the IA
considers in fact the sum of expected virtual surpluses in both countries and not the sum
of their true surpluses as an objective. To focus on the most interesting case from an
economic point of view, we assume that the following conditions hold:
(H1) E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α)) > 0,
(H2) E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α)) < 0.
These conditions establish that the infrastructure must be built as soon as at least one of
the countries is not too much concerned by poverty. They define in fact the constrained
efficient probabilities of realizing the project, i.e., the optimal probabilities when a util-
itarian welfare maximizer aggregates the countries’ welfare which take into account the
consumers’ incentive constraints. (H1) and (H2) also imply that the decision of building
or not the infrastructure is conditional on the exact profile of preferences for redistribu-
tion. A precise knowledge of those preferences is needed to fine-tune the policy of the IA.
This fine-tuning will be the source of some problems under asymmetric information on
the αis. Clearly, if it was optimal to do the project whatever the countries’ preferences,
asymmetric information on those preferences would not be an issue. It would be enough
to have both countries paying the same amount (something less or equal to the expected
virtual surplus of the α-one) to get enough cash to finance the project.
Proposition 1 summarizes the optimal mechanism offered by the benevolent IA.
Proposition 1 : Assume that the preferences profile α is common knowledge and that
conditions (H1) and (H2) both hold. Then, the optimal mechanism for collective decision
is characterized as follows.
• The decision to build or not the infrastructure is constrained efficient. Probabilities
of building the infrastructure are given by p¯∗ = pˆ∗ = 1 and p∗ = 0.
• The rich agents’ incentive constraint (6) is binding as soon as the project is done.
• The rich agents consume always the first-best amount x∗(θ¯) whereas the poor agents
in Ci consume the second-best quantity x˜(θ, αi) as soon as the project is built.
• Pricing in any country depends only on the local redistributive concerns.
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Of course, the redistributive concerns of each government affect the pricing schemes
suggested by the IA. Even though the IA puts an equal weight on both countries’ welfare,
governments are not efficiency maximizers, and there will remain some distortions in
consumption and pricing away from the first-best. However, there are no more distortions
than those implied by the local preferences for redistribution.
In each country, the rich consume at the first-best level. Instead, consumption is
still downward distorted for the poor and takes the same second-best value as if each
country was able to self-finance the project. Indeed, satisfying the incentive compatibility
constraint (6) requires to give more utility to a θ¯-agent than to a θ-one. Since governments
are averse to inequality between consumers, doing so is costly. This cost is reduced by
decreasing the consumption of the poor as it can be seen from (6).22
Since pricing within each country only depends on the local preferences for redistribu-
tion, there is a complete dichotomy between pricing and the decision to build or not the
project which, instead, depends on the preferences for redistribution in both countries.
This dichotomy may be lost under asymmetric information as we will see below. In that
case, there might appear an endogenous link between prices within both countries. Any
departure from the dichotomy result can thus be best understood as coming from the
impossibility for a given country to charge prices in the same way as if self-financing was
feasible. What Proposition 1 shows then is that the external constraints that a collective
agreement imposes on a country do not modify the redistributive concerns of each country
as long as the preferences profile for redistribution is common knowledge.
4 Asymmetric Information on Countries’ Preferences:
Constrained Efficiency
We now consider the case where the IA is uninformed on the αis. To understand precisely
the distortions involved by this added tier of asymmetric information, it is useful to see the
mechanism offered by the IA as specifying the contribution and the distribution of utility
for each country. Letting the governments report their preferences amounts to having
them choose within a menu of possible distributions of utility. This new formulation
is more tractable to express the various constraints of our problem and illuminates the
true nature of the decisions of those governments. In fine, governments are not really
interested in the prices charged to consumers per se but care about the distribution of
utility that those prices induce.
22Of course, a utilitarian government (corresponding to the limiting case α¯ = 1) does not care about the
distribution of utilities within the country. Then, the rich agents’ incentive constraint becomes costless
and the poor consume also the first-best consumption x∗(θ).
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Let us turn to a description of the governments’ Bayesian incentive constraints:
Vi(α¯) = E
α−i
(
E
θ
(Ui(θ, α¯, α−i))− ν(1− α¯)(Ui(θ¯, α¯, α−i)− Ui(θ, α¯, α−i))
)
≥ E
α−i
(
E
θ
(Ui(θ, α, α−i))− ν(1− α¯)(Ui(θ¯, α, α−i)− Ui(θ, α, α−i))
)
= Vi(α) + ν∆α E
α−i
(Ui(θ¯, α, α−i)− Ui(θ, α, α−i)). (11)
and
Vi(α) = E
α−i
(
E
θ
(Ui(θ, α, α−i))− ν(1− α)(Ui(θ¯, α, α−i)− Ui(θ, α, α−i))
)
≥ E
α−i
(
E
θ
(Ui(θ, α¯, α−i))− ν(1− α)(Ui(θ¯, α¯, α−i)− Ui(θ, α¯, α−i))
)
= Vi(α¯)− ν∆α E
α−i
(Ui(θ¯, α¯, α−i)− Ui(θ, α¯, α−i)). (12)
In what follows, the only relevant (binding) incentive constraint is (11). It says that a
rich country must be prevented from reporting being poor. By doing so, it indeed pays a
smaller contribution. Furthermore, because of asymmetric information on tastes, a given
level of aggregated welfare can only be implemented by imposing some costly inequality
within the country. A rich country finds it easier to bear such inequality. By mimicking
a poor country, a rich one can thus save on the redistribution costs. The less egalitarian
the distribution of utility in the poor country, the harder it is to satisfy the incentive
constraint (11).
Note also that, when the IA has the strongest ability to enforce the mechanism,
the countries’ participation constraints do not matter. Acceptance of the mechanism
is mandatory.
The IA proposes an incentive-compatible mechanism before knowing the realizations
of the αis. Using the definition of the Vi(·) and the fact that the IA maximizes now the
sum of expected welfares in both countries, IA’s problem becomes:
(TP )0 : max{p(·);xi(·);Ui(·);Vi(·)}
2∑
i=1
E
αi
(Vi(αi)),
subject to (6)-(7)-(8)-(11)-(12).
We also show in the Appendix that (TP )0 can be expressed in a more compact way as:
23
(TP )∗0 : max{p(·),xi(·),Vi(·)}
E
α
{
p(α)
(
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
)}
23The expression below no longer contains the contributions made by countries as variables. We show
in the Appendix that, reciprocally, one can find transfers which implement a corresponding allocation of
consumptions and aggregate welfare for each type of country.
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subject to (11)-(12), and
2∑
i=1
E
αi
(Vi(αi)) = E
α
{
p(α)
(
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
)}
(13)
Proposition 2 : Assume that the preferences profile α is private information and that
conditions (H1) and (H2) both hold. Then, the optimal mechanism is constrained efficient.
It entails the same probabilities of building the infrastructure, namely p¯∗ = pˆ∗ = 1 and
p∗ = 0 and the same second-best consumption levels as when preferences are common
knowledge.
The problem of building the infrastructure can be viewed as a public good problem
along the lines of D’Aspremont and Grard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979). The work
of these authors shows that one can design a Bayesian incentive compatible and ex post
budget-balanced mechanism which implements the ex ante efficient outcome. The same
logic applies here. However, there is an added complexity. The mechanism not only stip-
ulates whether the common infrastructure is built or not but it also defines prices in both
countries. On top of that, the outcome which maximizes the sum of expected welfare in
both countries is not first-best but constrained efficient because of the existing redistribu-
tive concerns of both governments. In the Appendix, we show that there exists a whole
continuum of mechanisms and contributions (which can be indexed by the level of aggre-
gate welfare in a poor country) which achieve this outcome.24 Given these contributions,
the pricing schemes within each country still give to the agents incentives to truthfully
report their tastes. Again, the distortions for consumption within each country are totally
disentangled from the decision rule on whether to build or not the infrastructure. The
dichotomy between pricing at the local level and the international collective decision is
maintained.
5 Asymmetric Information on Countries’ Preferences
and Countries’ Participation Constraints
Even though the results in Proposition 2 seem attractive on normative grounds and sug-
gest that asymmetric information may not be such an obstacle to investment, the previous
mechanisms suffer from a serious flaw since the countries’ participation constraints may
not be satisfied. In fact, accepting the international agreement is a sovereign act. To do
24Among these mechanisms, a focal one might be the so-called pay-the-externality mechanism stressed
by D’Aspremont and Grard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979). This mechanism is such that each country
pays a contribution equal to the expected shift in welfare that the other incurs following a change in its
own report.
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so, each country must get more than its payoff (that we have exogenously normalized at
zero) without any infrastructure.
Note that the symmetric mechanism which is the solution to (TP )∗0 defines only the
expected welfare qV (α¯)+(1−q)V (α) of a given country.25 As already stressed, there exists
a whole range of possible values of (V (α), V (α¯)) which satisfy the incentive constraints
(11) and (12) and correspond to the same expected welfare. One may wonder whether,
within this range, there exist some pairs (Vi(α), Vi(α¯)) satisfying also the following interim
participation constraints of countries:
Vi(α¯) ≥ 0, (14)
Vi(α) ≥ 0. (15)
In fact, with those participation constraints, constrained efficiency cannot always be
achieved.
Proposition 3 : The constrained efficient decision-rule (p¯∗, pˆ∗, p∗) and the second-best
levels of consumption x˜(θ, αi) can no longer be implemented when the countries’ interim
participation constraints (14) and (15) must be satisfied if the following condition holds:
2q2E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + 2q(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
< 2q2ν∆α∆θv(x˜(θ, α)). (16)
This condition says that the sovereignty of countries is a source of inefficiency when-
ever the aggregated welfare computed for the constrained efficient outcome is smaller
than the cost of inducing information revelation from the α¯−countries. Condition (16) is
related to an earlier result due to Laffont and Maskin (1979) who proved that Bayesian
incentive compatibility, efficiency, budget balance and individual rationality may be in-
compatible, and to Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) and Williams (1999) characterizations
of the individual rationality payoffs which reconcile all those requirements.
To induce revelation of the country’s preferences, the IA must propose an unequal
distribution of expected welfares across different types of countries. The α¯-country re-
ceives more than the α-one. From (11), the induced inequality is greater when the IA
maintains an efficient probability of building the infrastructure and sets pˆ∗ = 1. Indeed,
if the constrained efficient outcome was implemented, (11) could be written as:
Vi(α¯) ≥ Vi(α) + νq∆α∆θv(x˜(θ, α)) for i ∈ {1, 2}. (17)
25We omit indices because of symmetry.
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When pˆ∗ = 1 and the second-best consumption x˜(θ, α) is maintained, the right-hand
side of (17) is rather large meaning that Vi(α) must be significantly lower than Vi(α¯) to
ensure incentive compatibility. The α-country may thus end up with a negative expected
welfare. Satisfying the participation constraint of the α-country calls for reducing the
contribution of this country. This makes the α¯-country more eager to mimic the α-one,
hardening thereby its incentive constraint (11). Incentive compatibility at the country
level is thus easier to achieve if pˆ is distorted downwards and if, when countries have
different preferences for redistribution, the consumption of the poor agents within a α-
country is downward distorted below the second-best.
Let us characterize the optimal mechanism. Note that the IA’s problem becomes now:
(TP )SB : max
{p(·);xi(·),Ui(·),Vi(·)}
2∑
i=1
E
αi
(Vi(αi))
subject to (6)-(7)-(9)-(11)-(12)-(14)-(15).
We show in the Appendix that this problem can be simplified to:
(TP )SB∗ : max
{p(·),xi(·)}
E
α
{
p(α)
(
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
)}
subject to
E
α
{
p(α)
(
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
)}
−
2∑
i=1
{
νq∆α∆θ E
α−i
(p(α, α−i)v(xi(θ, α, α−i)))
}
≥ 0.
(18)
This constraint aggregates the ex post budget-balanced constraint (9), the relevant
(binding) incentive constraint (11) of the α¯-countries and the participation constraint
(15) of a α-country. Condition (18) simply means that the aggregate welfare over both
countries should cover the informational cost of inducing information revelation by the α¯-
countries. The impact of this constraint is akin to that of a budget-breaking constraint in
Ramsey-Boiteux models. As in those models, allocative distortions are needed to satisfy
(18) and the shadow cost of this constraint plays an important role in the characterization
of those distortions.
The optimal mechanism might be quite complex and involve distortions of both the
pricing rule and/or the decision to build or not the infrastructure. To obtain clear results
and highlight conditions such that both kinds of distortions are in fact needed, we will
assume that the fixed-cost F is large enough so that the following condition holds:
2q2E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + 2q(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, x∞(θ, α), α))
)
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< 2νq2∆α∆θv(x∞(θ, α)), (19)
where x∞(θ¯, α) = x∗(θ¯) and x∞(θ, α) is defined by:(
θ − ν(1− α)
1− ν ∆θ −
νq∆α
(1− ν)(1− q)∆θ
)
v′(x∞(θ, α)) = c. (20)
(19) strengthens condition (16) and describes cases where inefficiencies are large. Indeed,
there does not exist any modification of the second-best consumption x˜(θ, α) which, alone,
could ensure that the feasibility condition (18) is satisfied. Playing on the probability of
building or not the project is absolutely needed.26
Proposition 4 : Assume that countries can opt out of the mechanism if they do not get
a non-negative expected welfare and that condition (19) holds. The optimal mechanism is
characterized as follows.
• The α-country gets zero expected welfare (its participation constraint (15) is bind-
ing).
• The decision to build the infrastructure is distorted with the project being realized
less often than when countries’ preferences are common knowledge. In particular,
when countries are asymmetric, the probability of building the project is positive but
always less than one: p¯SB = p¯∗ = 1, pˆSB ∈]0, 1[, pSB = p∗ = 0.
• Consumptions in the α¯-countries are still constrained efficient; xSB(θ¯, α¯, α−i) =
x∗(θ¯) and xSB(θ, α¯, α−i) = x˜(θ, α¯) for all α−i.
• There is an extra downward distortion of the consumption of the poor in the α-
countries: xSB(θ¯, α, α¯) = x∗(θ¯) and xSB(θ, α, α¯) < x˜(θ, α). Denoting by λ > 0, the
shadow cost of the feasibility constraint (18), we have:(
θ − ν(1− α)
1− ν ∆θ −
λνq∆α
(1 + λ)(1− ν)(1− q)∆θ
)
v′(xSB(θ, α, α¯)) = c. (21)
• Pricing in a poor country depends on the shadow cost λ and thus on the redistributive
concerns within the rich country which is the only partner with which the project is
realized.
We already noticed that the conflict between the incentive constraint of a α¯-country
and the participation constraint of a α-one is solved by moving to a policy which is no
26When (19) does not hold but still (16) holds, we are in cases of intermediate inefficiencies where,
depending on the functional forms, a distortion on the decision to build or not the infrastructure may be
needed. To get sharper results, we omit these less interesting cases.
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longer constrained efficient. When countries have asymmetric preferences, the project
is no longer realized with probability one at the optimum. The optimal mechanism is
necessarily random and requires to cancel the project with some positive probability.27,28
To solve this conflict, the IA must make the distribution of utilities within the α-
country less attractive to a α¯-country. In a α¯-country, inequality is less costly than in
a α-one. By mimicking a α-country, a α¯-one reduces its overall contribution but it also
chooses a more egalitarian distribution of utilities. When the IA offers to a α-country
a pricing scheme inducing a very egalitarian distribution of utilities, it reduces also the
incentives of a α¯-country to mimic a α-one. A more egalitarian distribution of utilities in
the α-country is an optimal response to the informational problem that the IA faces.
From (21), everything happens thus as if the α-country had now a positive stronger
virtual aversion to inequality α˜ defined as:
α˜ = α− λq
(1 + λ)(1− q)∆α < α.
This modification of the redistributive concerns within the α-country captures how
the incentive problem between countries trickles down within the countries themselves.
Pricing within a α-country is distorted to limit consumption by the poor and make them
pay less for the infrastructure. In fact, by introducing a participation constraint at the
country level, one implicitly gives to the IA a redistributive concern and makes it averse
to inequality across countries. These concerns add up to the aversion to inequality within
countries themselves to justify more redistributive policies.
At a broader level, the fact that the nested information structure of our model leads to
extra distortions away from (constrained) efficiency bears some resemblance with some of
the results of the literature on hierarchical contracting.29 There, it is shown that taking
seriously into account the participation constraints of intermediate layers may increase
inefficiency when contracts at different tiers are chosen non-cooperatively. Nevertheless,
there remain several important differences with our model. Contrary to this literature,
we are concerned with the trade-off between efficiency and redistribution instead of that
between efficiency and rent extraction. Also, even though our information structure is
nested, the whole economy is ruled through a single mechanism which helps countries to
coordinate prices and not as a sequence of bilateral contracts chosen non-cooperatively
27In the game theoretic model of Arce and Sandler (2000), the IA acts also as a mediator who enforces
a correlated equilibrium where randomness in the outcome improves cooperation. In our framework, that
randomness relaxes incentive constraints.
28Of course, enforcing a random mechanism is a more difficult task than enforcing a deterministic
contract but the IA’s reputation may play a role in making credible the commitment to such a random
outcome.
29See Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1995), McAfee and McMillan (1995) and Faure-Grimaud,
Laffont and Martimort (2003) among others.
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by the different tiers of the hierarchy.30
Interestingly, the consumption xSB(θ, α, α¯) is always strictly above x∞(θ, α) which
is obtained by setting λ = +∞ into (21). This ranking captures again the fact that
distorting pricing is a useful tool to induce information revelation but it is not sufficient
alone. One cannot avoid cancelling the project with some positive probability. Moreover,
if the project is sometimes canceled, distortions in consumption are not maximal.
Importantly, the dichotomy between the decision to build or not the infrastructure
and the pricing rules no longer holds when countries must voluntarily participate to the
mechanism. Both pricing and the decision to build or not the project are used altogether
to solve the incentive problem at the country level. A lower probability of building the
infrastructure when countries are asymmetric relaxes (18) and makes it less necessary to
distort consumption in a poor country. If the project is realized less often, the marginal
price paid by the poor for an extra unit of consumption can be reduced with respect to
the price that would be charged had the IA committed to always realize the project when
the countries have asymmetric preferences.
The shadow cost λ of the feasibility constraint (18) plays a crucial role in linking
distortions on pricing and consumption and the distortion on the probability of realizing
the project. For instance, when condition (16) is almost an equality, i.e., for a fixed-cost
which is not too large,31 λ is small, the probability pˆ of building the project in the case of
asymmetric preferences is close to one and the distortions in the distribution of utilities
within the country are weakened. Pricing in a poor country is almost kept unchanged.
6 Loss of Control on Pricing
We now investigate a less comprehensive contracting environment where the IA can no
longer control pricing and let governments choose freely the prices charged to consumers.
This choice can thus be viewed as a moral hazard variable not observable by the IA. The
economy is no longer ruled through a set of bilateral contracts which are cooperatively set
by the IA but by bilateral contractual relationships between and within countries which
are no longer as coordinated. There is clearly a loss of control associated to relinquishing
control rights on pricing to the national level. This section analyzes the consequences of
this loss of control.
First, note that, for any probability of making the project and the overall contribution
30See nevertheless Section 6 for an extension where pricing is decided at the local level without coor-
dination between countries.
31Of course, this fixed cost must be large enough to ensure that two α-countries would not always build
the project under complete information so that (H2) holds.
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made by a country, consumptions reflect now only the preferences in this country, and
the optimal second-best profile of consumptions specific to each country x˜(θ, αi) is always
implemented. Second, the only screening instruments available to the IA are now the
contributions and the probability of building the infrastructure. A mechanism in this
environment is of the form {p(αˆ);Ti(αˆ)}.
Let us first redefine the expected welfare in country Ci as:
Vi(αi) = E
α−i
(
−Ti(α) + p(α)E
θ
(
S˜(θ, x˜(θ, αi), αi) +
F
2
))
. (22)
That definition already incorporates the fact that each government chooses pricing ac-
cording to its preferences only and that the corresponding consumptions are x˜(θ, αi).
We can rewrite the countries’ incentive constraints as:
Vi(α¯) ≥ Vi(α) + E
α−i
(p(α, α−i))
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
(23)
and
Vi(α) ≥ Vi(α¯)− E
α−i
(p(α¯, α−i))
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
. (24)
Taking into account the countries’ participation constraints, the IA’s problem can now
be written as:
(TP )L : max{p(·),Vi(·)}
2∑
i=1
E
αi
(Vi(αi))
subject to (8)-(14)-(15)-(22)-(23)-(24).
Of course, constrained efficiency may still be achieved even with the participation
constraint (15) just as in the case where pricing can be fully controlled. To analyze
more interesting cases characterized by some distortions, let us assume that the following
condition holds:
2q2E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + 2q(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
< 2q2
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
. (25)
Condition (25) is similar to (19) obtained when pricing can be fully controlled by
the IA. Again, (H1) and (H2) ensure that the decision to build or not the project is
case-sensitive and depends on the concerns for redistribution of both countries.
Proposition 5 : Assume that governments in each country keep control of pricing and
that conditions (H1), (H2) and (25) hold. The optimal mechanism with voluntary partic-
ipation of the countries is characterized as follows.
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• The incentive constraint of a α¯-country (23) and the participation constraint of a
α-one (15) are both binding.
• The decision to build the infrastructure is distorted with the project being realized
less often than when countries’ preferences are common knowledge. In particular,
when countries are asymmetric, the probability of building the project is positive but
always less than one: p¯L = 1, pˆL ∈]0, 1[ and pL = 0.
• The constrained efficient levels of consumption x˜(θ, αi) are always chosen in both
countries.
• By definition, the dichotomy between pricing and the decision to build or not the
infrastructure holds.
The IA can no longer play on prices to relax the rich country’s incentive constraint and
consumption is always constrained efficient. The only remaining screening tool available
becomes the probability of making the project when countries are asymmetric, namely
pˆ. As a result, we expect greater distortions in the decision to realize the project when
pricing of the infrastructure is out of the IA’s control. Cancelling more often the project
becomes an imperfect substitute for the missing control on prices.
To prove this result, we have to compare two third-best policies and, as usual, this
exercise is difficult because of the endogeneity of the multiplier. However, the next propo-
sition confirms that the intuition above is true at least under some conditions.
Proposition 6 : Assume that ∆θ is small enough, then pˆL < pˆ
SB.
Alternatively, the setting described in this section can be viewed as resulting from an
exogenous political constraint that forces the IA to let countries exert their sovereignty
in choosing prices. Relinquishing these control rights may again lead to an inefficiently
low provision of the infrastructure if pricing in both countries are kept independent.
7 An IA With Redistributive Concerns
So far, the IA was modeled as a benevolent maximizer of the sum of both countries’
expected welfares just in line with Myerson and Sattherwaite (1983) approach to modeling
a mediator in the bargaining process. The sole concern of this mediator was thus the
expected (constrained) efficiency of the outcome. This characterizes the most favorable
bargaining procedure from an ex ante viewpoint.
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Let us now look at the optimal mechanism that would be chosen by an IA with a
more active role on the redistribution side. Since bargaining will be less efficient, such a
mediator with his own redistributive concerns could only be accepted by the countries if
he subsidizes somewhat the project by bringing his own funds.32 Redistribution can be
pursued at the aggregate level, i.e., between countries, or at the individuals level. Both
cases are analyzed below.
Redistribution Across Countries: We now assume that the IA wants to maximize
the following weighted sum of the aggregate welfare in both countries:
2∑
i=1
βqVi(α¯)) + (1− βq)Vi(α) =
2∑
i=1
(
E
αi
(Vi(αi))− q(1− β)(Vi(α¯)− Vi(α))
)
where 0 < β < 1. This new objective function highlights the trade-off faced by the
IA between looking for a (constrained) efficient outcome which maximizes the sum of
expected welfares in both countries and minimizing the costly welfare inequality that
incentive compatibility at the countries level requires.33
Still assuming that countries can exert their sovereign rights and opt out of the mech-
anism if they wish so, the IA is constrained by the same budget-balanced, incentive and
participation constraints than in Section 5. After consolidation of these constraints, the
reduced form of the IA’s problem writes as:
(TP )∗RC : max{p(·),xi(·)}
E
α
{
p(α)
(
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
)}
−
2∑
i=1
νq(1− β)∆α∆θ E
α−i
(p(α, α−i)v(xi(θ, α, α−i)))
subject to (18).
Proposition 7 : Assume that countries can opt out of the mechanism, that the IA has
some redistributive concerns between countries and that conditions (H1), (H2) and (19)
hold. The optimal mechanism is similar to that in Proposition 4. In particular, it entails:
• A distortion in the decision to build the infrastructure when countries have asym-
metric preferences: p¯RC = 1, pˆRC ∈]0, 1[, pRC = 0.
32With that interpretation, the fixed cost F should be understood as net of this subsidy.
33This objective can be rationalized in the same way as what we did for the objective functions of the
governments themselves (see the Appendix for that case). By varying the reservation payoff of the poor
countries, one describe several possible values of β.
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• A downward distortion for the consumption of the poor in the α-country; xRC(θ¯, α, α¯) =
x∗(θ¯) and xRC(θ, α, α¯) < x˜(θ, α) with(
θ − ν
1− ν (1− α)∆θ −
(λ+ 1− β)ν∆α
(1 + λ)(1− ν)(1− q)∆θ
)
v′(xRC(θ, α, α¯)) = c (26)
where λ is the shadow cost of the feasibility constraint (18).
If the shadow cost λ was the same for problems (TP )SB∗ and (TP )∗RC , the consumption
would be more distorted when the IA has some redistributive concerns. The intuition is
straightforward. The distribution of welfare across countries is now viewed as being
directly costly and not, as in Section 5, only indirectly because of the presence of the
α-country’s participation constraint. This new direct reason for reducing Vi(α¯) calls for
extra downward distortions.34 Far from helping in improving expected welfare in the poor
countries the redistributive concerns of the IA call for greater downward distortions in
consumption and a reinforced link between pricing in both countries.
Redistribution Within Countries: Let us look at the case where the IA has some
concerns for poverty at the individual level and puts an extra exogenous positive weight
µ on the utility levels of the poor agents. This reduced form can be rationalized by
introducing explicitly a subsistence level (or reservation payoff) for the poorest agents
into the constraints of a benevolent mediator.35 Formally, the IA now maximizes:(
2∑
i=1
E
αi
Vi(αi)
)
+ µ
(
2∑
i=1
E
α
(Ui(θ, α))
)
where µ > 0. Because the rich agents’ incentive constraints within each country are
binding, we have:
E
α−i
(Ui(θ, αi, α−i)) = Vi(αi)− αiν∆θ E
α−i
(p(α)v(x(θ, α))). (27)
We can finally rewrite the IA’s objective function as:
E
αi
(
Vi(αi)− αiµν
1 + µ
∆θ E
α−i
(p(α)v(x(θ, α)))
)
.
Because µ > 0, the welfare inequality within countries is viewed as costly by the IA.
34A more formal comparison is made difficult by the fact that the shadow cost changes between the
two problems and that computing explicitly those shadow costs is difficult as usual in second-best envi-
ronments.
35Because of incentive compatibility within countries, the same subsistence level is also satisfied for the
rich agents.
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Following the same steps as before, the reduced form of the IA’s problem can be
written as:
(TP )∗RA : max{p(·),xi(·)}
E
α
{
p(α)
(
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))− µ
1 + µ
ναi∆θv(xi(θ, α))
))
subject to (18).
We need to describe a pair of conditions similar to (H1) and (H2) which ensure that the
project would be done under complete information on the preferences profile if and only
if at least one of the country is a rich one. Those conditions are:
(H1’) E
θ
(
S˜
(
θ, x˜
(
θ,
α¯
1 + µ
)
,
α¯
1 + µ
))
+ E
θ
(
S˜
(
θ, x˜
(
θ,
α
1 + µ
)
,
α
1 + µ
))
> 0,
(H2’) E
θ
(
S˜
(
θ, x˜
(
θ,
α
1 + µ
)
,
α
1 + µ
))
< 0.
Proposition 8 : Assume that countries can opt out of the mechanism, that the IA has
some redistributive concerns and cares about poverty within countries and that conditions
(H1’), (H2’) and (19) hold. The optimal mechanism is similar to that in Proposition 4.
In particular, it entails:
• A distortion in the decision to build the infrastructure when countries have asym-
metric preferences: p¯RA = 1, pˆRA ∈]0, 1[, pRA = 0.
• Strong downward distortions for the consumption of the poor in both a α¯− and a
α-country if the project is realized:(
θ − ν
1− ν
(
1− α¯
1 + µ
)
∆θ
)
v′(xRA(θ, α¯, α¯)) = c (28)
(
θ − ν
1− ν
(
1− α
1 + µ
)
∆θ − λνq∆α
(1 + λ)(1− ν)(1− q)∆θ
)
v′(xRA(θ, α, α¯)) = c
(29)
where λ is the shadow cost of the feasibility constraint (18).
The IA’s concern for poverty limits the prices charged to the poor in both countries.
The bulk of the contribution is thus borne by the rich agents. This hardens their incentive
constraint and requires further distortions of the consumption of the poor to make their
allocation less attractive to the rich. As a result, there will be strong distortions on
consumptions even if both countries are rich.
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Looking at the solution, everything happens as if, a priori, the preferences for redis-
tribution could be characterized by a new parameter β = α
1+µ
< α and then an analysis
similar to that of Section 5 follows. The IA’s concerns for poverty trickles down again
to the local level. The external mechanism for public good provision puts enough con-
straints on local governments to modify their preferences for redistribution and makes
them behave as being more averse to inequality than what they really are.
8 Extensions and Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how asymmetric information may impede efficiency in the
provision of transnational projects. Optimal mechanisms may call for cancelling more
often the projects than when the preference profile for redistribution of the countries
involved is common knowledge. Consumption by the poor is also reduced for incentive
compatibility reasons and prices in both countries are linked.
Transnational projects have also an impact on the distribution of utilities within coun-
tries. The governments’ concerns for redistribution might be exacerbated by the external
constraints imposed by the IA’s mechanism. The IA’s concerns for redistribution either
across or within countries spill over to the local level, reinforce the governments’ own con-
cerns for redistribution, affects pricing and the decision to build or not the infrastructure.
Another common theme of the models developed above is that the number of instru-
ments for enforcing the mechanism determines the size of the inefficiency. As the IA has
less control of the project (either because it cannot force acceptance by sovereign countries
or because it cannot control prices), inefficiency increases and the project is less likely to
be implemented. At a broad level, these results suggest that some form of sovereignty
loss is needed to facilitate the structural investments which are necessary for growth.
Otherwise, investments may be kept inefficiently low to preserve ex post agreement of
countries.
Various extensions of our framework would be worth to be undertaken.
Comparison with Other Forms of Financing: A more complete analysis should com-
pare the costs and benefits of various institutions for accessing to those infrastructures.
In this respect, it is striking that the very argument of sovereignty loss that was used to
criticize financing by private foreign investors comes with a revenge in the case of an a
priori more cooperative bargaining solution. More generally, it would be worth to com-
pare the outcome achieved with those collective mechanisms with what is achieved when
countries decide to get access to those infrastructures by using foreign private investors.
One important question from a policy point of view is to know whether the cooperative
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solution discussed in this paper is subject to as much renegotiation as the traditional
devices. Even though no theory is yet available, some comments can already been made.
Indeed, it is well known from adverse selection models that transaction costs of contract-
ing under asymmetric information are lower when bargaining powers are more equal than
with asymmetric bargaining powers. The strong bargaining position of foreign private
financiers in contracting suggests therefore that there exist then large costs of signing and
renegotiating contracts that could be (at least partially) avoided through joint effort by
countries.
Political Economy: Our approach so far has been mostly normative and an obvious
extension would be to deal more precisely with the political economy side of the model.
Political economy considerations could help to endogenize the preferences for redistribu-
tion at the local level. An important issue that could be analyzed is the corruption of
governments, a phenomenon which is very likely to arise given the important financial
stakes involved with transnational projects. Politics could also help to understand the
IA’s objective function if the latter was modeled as a more active actor obeying to his
own incentives and reputational concerns.
Voluntary Contributions: In our framework, we gave to the IA a strong commitment
ability by having it move first and commit itself to a mechanism. This approach yields
an upper bound on what can be achieved through any bargaining mechanism between
countries. An alternative and weaker view of the IA would be to see it as simply collecting
voluntary contributions. Although there exists now a literature on voluntary contributions
under asymmetric information,36 none of these papers have considered the case where
voluntary contributions are made by countries and not by individuals. It would be worth
to provide such an extension and compare the equilibrium outcomes with that achieved
under the more centralized mechanism described in this paper.
Externalities and Scale Economies: The externality between countries was modeled
in a rather crude way. In our model, scale economies can only be achieved by building
a common infrastructure. Other forms of increasing returns could be considered. For
instance, it may become at the margin easier to provide consumption to new consumers
as others are already served.37 Decreasing marginal costs introduce some new features.
Downward distortions in consumption must be somewhat mitigated to keep low marginal
costs. Inducing such distortions as screening devices seems less useful than playing on the
probabilities of building the project. One may expect that the infrastructure should be
less often built as increasing returns become more important whereas at the same time
consumption should not bet distorted too much.
36See Menezes, Monteiro and Temini (2001), Laussel and Palfrey (2003) and Martimort and Moreira
(2003) for instance.
37A typical example could be irrigation.
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Network externality may also affect demand.38 The existence of such a transnational
network externality gives a new role to the IA who now proposes prices which make
each country internalize the impact of its own consumption choices on the other. Of
course, this requires that the IA can fully control those prices. In the absence of such a
control, local governments would choose prices non-cooperatively and this would lead to
inefficient consumption because of a (non-internalized) positive externality. However, to
benefit from the network externality, consumptions should not be too distorted. Again,
the only screening tool available to the IA remains then the probability of cancelling the
project.
Local Infrastructures: An alternative to the transnational project may be to build
infrastructures of a lesser scale in each country. The reservation payoff of each country
is no longer zero and depends explicitly on its preferences for redistribution. New issues
in the design of the collective agreement may appear. Ex post agreement between the
countries may now become harder and as a result one should expect the project to be less
often realized. On the other hand, one important lesson of adverse selection models with
type-dependent reservation payoffs is that those outside opportunities, when binding, tend
to reduce allocative inefficiencies and consumption should be kept close to the second-
best.39
Global Public Goods: Even though, we had in mind specific examples of transnational
infrastructure for developing countries in writing this paper, its lessons may have also
some value to understand the governance of more general global public goods (or bads)
like global warming, disease prevention, trade agreements, etc...
We hope to investigate some of the specific issues raised by those public goods in
further research.
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Appendix
• Endogenizing Government’s Preferences and Asymmetric Information: Let
us suppose that pricing is used to cover a random deficit κ˜ ∈ {κ, κ¯} with respective
probabilities q and 1 − q and κ¯ > κ. We suppose that the government is benevolent
and maximizes the sum of utilities of the different types of agents subject to the agents’
incentive and participation constraints that we will normalize at some exogenous level
U0. Focusing (as usual) only on the rich agent’s incentive constraint and the poor agent’s
participation one, the government’s problem can be written as:
max
{x(·),U(·)}
νU(θ¯) + (1− ν)U(θ).
subject to
U(θ¯)− U(θ) ≥ ∆θv(x(θ)), (A.1)
U(θ) ≥ U0, (A.2)
and
νU(θ¯) + (1− ν)U(θ) + κ ≤ ν(θ¯v(x(θ¯))− cx(θ¯)) + (1− ν)(θv(x(θ))− cx(θ)), (A.3)
where the latter constraint is the budget constraint of the state when the deficit is κ. Of
course, this constraint is binding at the optimum.
From (A.1) and (A.2), (A.3) implies:
ν(θ¯v(x(θ¯))− cx(θ¯)) + (1− ν)(θv(x(θ))− cx(θ)) ≥ κ+ ν∆θv(x(θ)) + U0. (A.4)
When κ is large enough (but not too large so that the constrained set remains non-
empty), this constraint is clearly no longer satisfied by the first-best optimal levels of
consumptions x∗(θ) and x∗(θ¯). Then, (A.4) is binding at the optimum (and consequently
(A.1) and (A.2) are also binding). We can rewrite the government’s problem as
max
{x(·)}
ν(θ¯v(x(θ¯))− cx(θ¯)) + (1− ν)(θv(x(θ))− cx(θ))
subject to (A.4).
Denoting by µ(κ) the positive multiplier of (A.4), the government maximizes
(1− ν)(θv(x(θ))− cx(θ)) + ν(θ¯v(x(θ¯))− cx(θ¯))− νµ(κ)
1 + µ(κ)
∆θv(x(θ))
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for some µ(κ) > 0, where µ(κ) is given by the slackness condition. Of course µ(κ) is
increasing in κ. Denoting 1− α¯ = µ(κ¯)
1+µ(κ)
and 1− α = µ(κ)
1+µ(κ)
, we observe that everything
happens as if the government maximizes an objective function of the type ανU(θ¯) + (1−
αν)U(θ). Private information on the parameter α can thus be viewed as a reduced form
for private information on the shock κ hitting the budget constraint of the State.
• Transformation of (TP )FB into (TP )FB∗ and Proof of Proposition 1: First, we
rewrite the objective function of the IA which becomes:
2∑
i=1
(
νUi(θ¯, α) + (1− ν)Ui(θ, α)− ν(1− αi)(Ui(θ¯, α)− Ui(θ, α))
)
for a given preferences profile α = (α1, α2). Clearly, this shows that (9) must be binding
at the optimum and we get thus:
2∑
i=1
V˜i(α) = p(α)
{
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S(θ, xi(θ, α)))
}
−
2∑
i=1
ν(1− αi)(Ui(θ¯, α)− Ui(θ, α))). (A.5)
Since αi < 1, the second term on the right-hand side of (A.5) is minimized when (6)
is binding. Note then that (7) is slack as soon as xi(θ, α) < xi(θ¯, α), a monotonicity
condition that will be checked ex post.
Inserting (6) binding into (A.5) yields the maximand of (TP )FB∗, namely:
p(α)
{
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
}
.
The second-best consumptions x˜(θ, αi) maximize this expression. Of course x˜(θ, αi) <
x∗(θ¯) and (6) binding implies that (7) is slack.
Under assumptions (H1) and (H2), we have pˆ∗ = 1 and p∗ = 0. Moreover, by def-
inition of x˜(θ, α) and the fact that the government in the poor country is more averse
to inequality that in the rich country, x˜(θ, α) < x˜(θ, α¯). Finally, E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) >
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α)). Hence, assumption (H1) implies also that p¯∗ = 1.
• Transformation of (TP )0 into (TP )∗0, and Proof of Proposition 2: First, we
observe that:
Vi(αi) = E
α−i
(
E
θ
(Ui(θ, α))− ν(1− αi)(Ui(θ¯, α)− Ui(θ, α))
)
= E
α−i
(
p(α)
(
E
θ
(S(θ, x(θ, α))) +
F
2
)
− ν(1− αi)(Ui(θ¯, α)− Ui(θ, α))
)
− E
α−i
(Ti(α)).
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For a symmetric mechanism, E
α−i
(Ti(α¯, α−i)) = qT¯ + (1 − q)Tˆ1 and E
α−i
(Ti(α, α−i)) =
qTˆ2 + (1− q)T . Hence, still using the symmetry of the mechanism, we have:
2∑
i=1
E
αi
(Vi(αi)) = E
α
(
p(α)
(( 2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S(θ, xi(θ, α)))
)
+ F
))
−
2∑
i=1
ν(1− αi)(Ui(θ¯, α)− Ui(θ, α))− E
α
(
2∑
i=1
Ti(α)
)
.
Maximization of this expression subject to the ex post budget constraints (8) is obtained
when all such constraints are binding. Moreover, as in the proof of Proposition 1, the
right-hand side above is maximized when (6) is binding, i.e.,
Ui(θ¯, α)− Ui(θ, α) = p(α)∆θv(xi(θ, α)), for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
Again, the fact that xi(θ, α) < xi(θ¯, α) for the solution ensures that (7) is then slack.
Gathering all those facts, we obtain:
2∑
i=1
E
αi
(Vi(αi)) = E
α
{
p(α)
(
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
)}
, (A.6)
i.e., the maximand of (TP0)
∗ with the incentive constraints of both countries (11) and
(12).
There exists a whole range of solutions to this problem which are all characterized by
the same consumptions and the same aggregate welfare. We will focus on the symmetric
ones and thus omit indices. This allows us a clear characterization of the incentive compat-
ible pairs (V (α¯), V (α)). There is still a whole range of such symmetric pairs (V (α¯), V (α))
which satisfy (A.6) as an equality and the incentive constraints (11) and (12).
Since (A.6) holds as an equality, defining V (α) defines also V (α¯). All possible values
of V (α) describe the interval [Vm(α), VM(α)] where:
Vm(α) =
A
2
− νq∆α∆θv(x˜(θ, α¯)),
VM(α) =
A
2
− νq2∆α∆θv(x˜(θ, α));
and A is the right-hand side of (A.6) computed for the constrained efficient probabilities
p¯∗ = pˆ∗ = 1, p∗ = 0 and the second-best consumptions x˜(θ, α). We have thus:
A = 2q2E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + 2q(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
.
Since q < 1 and x˜(θ, α) < x˜(θ, α¯), we have indeed VM(α) > Vm(α). For any V (α) in
[Vm(α), VM(α)] and the corresponding value of V (α¯) obtained when (A.6) is binding, we
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can find the values of the symmetric transfers (T¯ , Tˆ1, Tˆ2, T ) which implement these utility
levels as solutions to the following system:
V (α) = qpˆ∗
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xSB(θ, α, α¯))) +
F
2
)
− (qTˆ2 + (1− q)T ) (A.7)
V (α¯) = qp¯∗
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xSB(θ, α¯, α¯))) +
F
2
)
+ (1− q)pˆ∗
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xSB(θ, α¯, α))) +
F
2
)
−(qT¯ + (1− q)Tˆ1) (A.8)
2T¯ = p¯∗F, (A.9)
Tˆ1 + Tˆ2 = pˆ
∗F, (A.10)
2T = p∗F, (A.11)
where p¯∗ = pˆ∗ = 1 and p∗ = 0.
Note that (A.9) and (A.11) yield immediately T¯ = F
2
and T = 0 meaning that no
transfer is paid when the project is not done. Finally, (Tˆ1, Tˆ2) is immediately obtained as
a solution to (A.7) and (A.10).
• Proof of Proposition 3: The same decision rule and consumptions as in Proposition 2
can no longer be obtained when the preferences for redistribution are unknown if VM(α) <
0. Writing this condition yields (16).
• Transformation of (TP )SB into (TP )SB∗ and Proof of Proposition 4: Since
(16) holds, (17) is not satisfied by the solution obtained when the preferences profile
α = (α1, α2) is common knowledge. Hence, we should look for a solution of (TP )
SB
such that (11) and (15) (and thus (18)) will be binding. The fact that (15) and (11) are
satisfied implies (for a positive x(θ, α, α¯)) that (14) holds strictly, so that this constraint
can be omitted in the optimization below.
Let us omit also the incentive constraint (12) (which can be checked ex post). Then,
we can rewrite (TP )SB in a more compact way as:
(TP )SB
′
: max
{p(·),xi(·),Vi(·)}
E
α
{
p(α)
(
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
)
−
2∑
i=1
ν(1− αi)(Ui(θ¯, α)− Ui(θ, α))
}
,
subject to (6)-(7)-(11)-(15) and
2∑
i=1
E
αi
(Vi(αi)) = E
α
{
p(α)
(
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
)
−
2∑
i=1
ν(1− αi)(Ui(θ¯, α)− Ui(θ, α))
}
.
(A.12)
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Using (11) and (15), we get
E
α
{
p(α)
(
2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
)
−
2∑
i=1
ν(1− αi)(Ui(θ¯, α)− Ui(θ, α))
}
=
2∑
i=1
E
αi
(Vi(αi)) ≥
2∑
i=1
νq∆α E
α−i
(Ui(θ¯, α, α−i)− Ui(θ, α, α−i)). (A.13)
Optimizing first with respect to Ui(·), (6) is binding to increase the maximand in (TP )SB′
and relax constraint (A.13). (7) is slack as it can be checked ex post. Inserting the
corresponding value of Ui(θ¯, α)− Ui(θ, α) into (A.13) and the maximand of (TP )SB′ , we
get (18) and the expression of the maximand of IA’s problem as (TP )SB∗.
Let denote by λ the positive multiplier of (18) into (TP )SB∗. The Lagrangean is :
E
α
{
(1 + λ)p(α)
( 2∑
i=1
E
θ
(S˜(θ, xi(θ, α), αi))
)}
−
2∑
i=1
λνq∆α∆θ E
α−i
(v(xi(θ, α, α−i))) .
Optimizing with respect to xi(·) yields a symmetric solution such that
• For a rich country,
θ¯v′(xSB(θ¯, α¯, α−i)) = c, ∀ α−i
and so xSB(θ¯, α¯, α−i) = x∗(θ¯);(
θ − ν(1− α¯)
1− ν ∆θ
)
v′(xSB(θ, α¯, α−i)) = c, ∀ α−i
and so xSB(θ, α¯, α−i) = x˜(θ, α¯);
• For a poor country,
θ¯v′(xSB(θ¯, α, α−i)) = c, ∀ α−i
and so xSB(θ¯, α, α−i) = x∗(θ¯);(
θ − ν(1− α)
1− ν ∆θ −
λqν∆α
(1 + λ)(1− q)(1− ν)∆θ
)
v′(xSB(θ, α, α−i)) = c, ∀ α−i
and so xSB(θ, α, α−i) < x˜(θ, α) since λ > 0.
Let us now optimize with respect to p¯, pˆ and p. We obtain:
p¯SB = 1⇔ 2(1 + λ)q2E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) > 0 (A.14)
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which holds from (H1),
pˆSB ∈ [0, 1] ⇔
2(1 + λ)q(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, xSB(θ, α, α¯), α))
)
= 2λq2ν∆α∆θv(xSB(θ, α, α¯)), (A.15)
pSB = 0⇔
2(1 + λ)(1− q)2E
θ
(S˜(θ, xSB(θ, α, α), α)) < 2λq(1− q)ν∆α∆θv(xSB(θ, α, α)). (A.16)
This latter inequality holds since xSB(θ, α, α) < x˜(θ, α) implies thatE
θ
(S˜(θ, xSB(θ, α, α), α)) <
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α)) < 0 from condition (H2).
From (18) binding, and taking also into account that p¯SB = 1 and pSB = 0, we get
that pˆSB, if it belongs to ]0, 1[, is the solution to the following equation:
pˆSB(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, xSB(θ, α, α¯), α))
)
+qE
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) = qνpˆSB∆α∆θv(xSB(θ, α, α¯)). (A.17)
Using (A.15) and (A.17), we obtain:
pˆSB
ν
1 + λ
∆α∆θv(xSB(θ, α, α¯)) = E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)). (A.18)
The right-hand side is positive by condition (H1). Hence, pˆSB > 0. Let us now show
that pˆSB < 1 is necessary when condition (19) holds. Observe that x∞(θ, α) defined by
(20) maximizes −qν∆α∆θv(x) + (1 − q)(1 − ν)S˜(θ, x, α). Therefore, even the strongest
possible distortion on x(θ, α, α¯) makes it impossible to satisfy (18). A distortion of pˆ is
necessary.
Finally, to find the values of the transfers (T¯ , Tˆ1, Tˆ2, T ) one can proceed as in the proof
of Proposition 3. Note that there is no freedom in the choice of V (α) which is always
zero.
• Proof of Proposition 5: When (H1) and (H2) hold, the optimal policy when the
preferences profile α = (α1, α2) is common knowledge is thus p¯
∗ = pˆ∗ = 1, p∗ = 0.
We now transform (TP )L into (TP )
∗
L below:
(TP )∗L : max{p(·)}
E
α
{
p(α)
(
E
θ
(
2∑
i=1
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, αi), αi)
))}
,
subject to
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E
α
{
p(α)
(
E
θ
(
2∑
i=1
S˜(θ, x˜(θ, αi), αi))
)}
−
2∑
i=1
qE
αi
(p(α, α−i))
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
≥ 0. (A.19)
To do so, we proceed as before and the proof is omitted. Denoting by λL the positive
multiplier of (A.19) and optimizing the corresponding Lagrangean with respect to p¯, pˆ
and p within [0, 1] yields:
p¯L = 1 ⇔ 2(1 + λL)q2E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) > 0, (A.20)
pˆL ∈ [0, 1] ⇔ 2(1 + λL)q(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
= 2λLq
2
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
, (A.21)
p
L
= 0 ⇔ 2(1 + λL)(1− q)2E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
< 2λLq(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
.(A.22)
Of course, p¯∗ = 1 and p∗ = 0 imply that (A.20) and (A.22) both hold. Inserting
p¯L = 1, pL = 0 and (A.21) into (A.19) binding yields:
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) =
pˆL
1 + λL
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
, (A.23)
and thus pˆL > 0.
Using (A.19) binding, we can derive pˆL explicitly as:
pˆL =
qE(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))
q
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
− (1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
Finally pˆL < 1 when condition (25) holds.
• Proof of Proposition 6: We derive from the proof of Proposition 4 (equation (A.15))
that λ is given by the following expression:
λ
1 + λ
=
(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, xSB(θ, α, α¯), α))
)
qν∆α∆θv(xSB(θ, α, α¯))
.
For ∆θ small enough, xSB(θ, α, α¯) differs from x˜(θ, α) by a term of order ∆θ. Since
x˜(θ, α) maximizes S˜(θ, x, α), the factor in the numerator above differs ofE
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))+
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E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α)) by terms of order ∆θ2. Therefore, we have up to terms of order ∆θ2
on the right-hand side below
λ∆θ
1 + λ
=
(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
qν∆αv(x˜(θ, α))
(
1− v
′(x˜(θ, α))∆x
v(x˜(θ, α))
)
where ∆x = xSB(θ, α, α¯)− x˜(θ, α) < 0.
Similarly, we get from the proof of Proposition 5 that the multiplier λL is given by
λL
1 + λL
=
(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
)
q
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
) .
We thus observe that:
λ
1 + λ
≥ λL
1 + λL
Eθ (S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− Eθ (S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
ν∆α∆θv(x˜(θ, α))
 .
The bracketed term in the right-hand side above is greater than one since we have
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))− ν∆α∆θv(x˜(θ, α)) =
(1− ν)(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α¯)) > 0
by definition of x˜(θ, α¯). Finally, we get that λ > λL.
Let us turn to the expressions of pˆSB and pˆL. We have the following approximations
(up to terms of order ∆θ2)
pˆSB =
(1 + λ)E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))
ν∆θ∆αv(x˜(θ, α))
,
and
pˆL =
(1 + λL)E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))− E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α))
) .
Since λL < λ and E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯))−E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α), α)) > ν∆θ∆αv(x˜(θ, α)), we get
pˆL < pˆ
SB.
• Proof of Proposition 7: The consolidation of incentive, budget-balanced and par-
ticipation constraints into (18) is the same as before and is thus omitted. When β < 1,
the α¯-country incentive constraint is binding. This leads to the maximand of (TP )∗RC .
Optimizing the Lagrangean and proceeding exactly as in the proof of Proposition 4 yields
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the consumption distortions in the text whereas probabilities of building the project are
given by:
p¯RC = 1⇔ 2(1 + λ)q2E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) > 0, (A.24)
which holds from (H1).
pˆRC ∈ [0, 1] ⇔
2(1 + λ)q(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, xRC(θ, α, α¯), α))
)
= 2(λ+ 1− β)q2ν∆α∆θv(xRC(θ, α, α¯)), (A.25)
p
RC
= 0⇔
2(1 + λ)(1− q)2E
θ
(S˜(θ, xRC(θ, α, α), α)) < 2(λ+ 1− β)q(1− q)ν∆α∆θv(xRC(θ, α, α)).
(A.26)
This latter inequality holds from condition (H2).
From (18) binding, and taking also into account that p¯RC = 1 and pRC = 0, we get
that pˆSB, if it belongs to ]0, 1[, is the solution to the following equation:
pˆRC(1− q)
(
E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) + E
θ
(S˜(θ, xRC(θ, α, α¯), α))
)
+qE
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)) = qνpˆRC∆α∆θv(xRC(θ, α, α¯)). (A.27)
Using (A.25) and (A.27), we obtain:
pˆRC
νβ
1 + λ
∆α∆θv(xRC(θ, α, α¯)) = E
θ
(S˜(θ, x˜(θ, α¯), α¯)). (A.28)
The right-hand side is positive by condition (H1). Hence, pˆRC > 0. As in the proof of
Proposition 4, one can show that pˆRC < 1 is necessary when condition (19) holds.
• Proof of Proposition 8: The consolidation of incentive, budget-balanced and partic-
ipation constraints into (18) is the same as before and is thus omitted. When (19) holds,
the α¯-country incentive constraint is binding. This leads to the maximand of (TP )∗RA.
Optimizing the Lagrangean and proceeding exactly as in the proof of Proposition 4 with
the new conditions (H1’) and (H2’) yields the probabilities and consumptions in the text.
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